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a b s t r a c t 
Climate policy has been mainly studied with economic models that assume representative, 
rational agents. Such policy aims, though, at changing carbon-intensive consumption and 
production patterns driven by bounded rationality and other-regarding preferences, such as 
status and imitation. To examine climate policy under such alternative behavioral assump- 
tions, we develop a model tool by adapting an existing general-purpose macroeconomic 
multi-agent model. The resulting tool allows testing various climate policies in terms of 
combined climate and economic performance. The model is particularly suitable to ad- 
dress the distributional impacts of climate policies, not only because populations of many 
agents are included, but also as these are composed of different classes of households. The 
approach accounts for two types of innovations, which improve either the carbon or labor 
intensity of production. We simulate policy scenarios with distinct combinations of car- 
bon taxation, a reduction of labor taxes, subsidies for green innovation, a price subsidy to 
consumers for less carbon-intensive products, and green government procurement. The re- 
sults show pronounced differences with those obtained by rational-agent model studies. It 
turns out that a supply-oriented subsidy for green innovation, funded by the revenues of a 
carbon tax, results in a signiﬁcant reduction of carbon emissions without causing negative 
effects on em ployment. On the contrary, demand-oriented subsidies for adopting greener 
technologies, funded in the same manner, result in either none or considerably less re- 
duction of carbon emissions and may even lead to higher unemployment. Our study also 
contributes insight on a potential double dividend of shifting taxes from labor to carbon. 
© 2019 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. 
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license. 
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 1. Introduction 
The study and testing of climate policies is predominantly undertaken using models that assume representative, rational
economic agents. It is nevertheless widely accepted now that this does not represent an accurate approximation of a reality
characterized by heterogeneous agents with bounded rationality and socially mediated preferences, such as imitation, status∗ Corresponding author. 
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 or snob effects. Recognizing such boundedly rational behavior is relevant for the study of climate policies, as they aim to
stimulate people to drastically change their decisions and even life styles ( Gowdy, 2008 ; Brekke and Johansson-Stenman,
2008 ; Gsottbauer and van den Bergh, 2010 ). This raises questions about behavioral barriers and opportunities, and to what
extent we can expect major societal changes and systems transitions ( Grin et al., 2010 ). Existing climate-economy models
are not well equipped in a behavioral sense to answer such questions. 
Here we offer an original study of climate policy using an evolutionary macroeconomic model. It uses agent-based
methodology to describe an artiﬁcial one-country economy, accounting for different types of boundedly rational and socially
mediated preferences of agents. It is the result of adapting and extending a general-purpose evolutionary macroeconomic
model developed by Rengs and Scholz-Wäckerle (2014 , 2017 , 2019 ). This model belongs to a growing set of agent-based
models (ABMs) in macroeconomics and political economy, which respond to a call in economics to give more attention to
behavior, heterogeneity and complexity in ﬁnancial- and macroeconomics ( LeBaron and Tesfatsion, 2008 ; Farmer and Foley,
2009 ; Delli Gatti et al., 2010 ; Kirman, 2011 ; Stiglitz and Gallegati, 2011 ). It further connects to earlier climate policy studies
such as Gerst et al. (2013) – which rely on an aggregated household sector and do not feature a banking sector – and an
emerging literature on evolutionary-economic analysis of energy transitions ( Safarzynska et al., 2012 ). In contrast, the evo-
lutionary macroeconomic model presented here features heterogeneous ﬁrms and households, a banking sector with credit
relations and private debt, and distinctive ownership of ﬁrms by capitalists. Thus it provides a solid basis for investigating
the economic and environmental effects of climate policy packages. 
The proposed model describes households who consume goods that serve aspirations for needs and wants, respectively.
The ﬁrst type of consumption is necessary, while the social mediation of preferences, such as through status and imitation,
motivates people’s consumption of the second type. In the present model setting, status and snob effects make ﬁrm and
bank owners switch the consumption of wants and search for new ﬁrms, thus forming an important factor of economic
innovation. Firms innovate on the basis of how well they performed in the last period. The model includes two types of
innovation: in emission reduction technology, increasing the productivity of carbon in the economy (thus reducing the need
for carbon or fossil fuels), which may be subsidized by governments; and innovation in labor productivity. 1 The incorpora-
tion of the two innovation types is relevant as it allows comparing and balancing innovations that affect the environment
and employment, and also other economic variables such as income and wealth, in distinct ways. The environmental ex-
tension of the general evolutionary macroeconomic model further involves the speciﬁcation of CO 2 emissions by ﬁrms. The
carbon intensity (emissions per unit of (monetary) output) of a ﬁrm can be reduced through enhancing its carbon pro-
ductivity, i.e., green innovation. Firms ask for loans at commercial banks in order to invest into new machinery and R&D,
while the government decides about a policy package that comprises various types of taxes, including possibly a carbon
tax, subsidies that lower consumer prices of low-carbon alternatives, and subsidies on technological innovation or adoption,
or investment in green procurement. These climate policy packages are the only mechanisms assumed in the model that
could enable a systemic change towards a low-carbon economy in the simulation experiments. It is crucial to stress that we
do not assume any further agent-speciﬁc behavioral mechanisms that could additionally enable the mitigation of emissions
(e.g., a particular aspiration for less carbon-intensive goods). 
We use the resulting evolutionary macroeconomic model and its environmental extension to test different climate poli-
cies in terms of their impacts on a range of relevant environmental and economic indicators as well as on the distribution of
wealth. Except for a ﬁrst climate policy package (CPP), which transfers the collected tax revenues to the regular government
budget, we study CPPs which put these revenues in a “carbon fund” which then ﬁnancially supports additional policies. This
gives rise to ﬁve additional CPPs. The second CPP subsidizes green innovation. A third one considers a tax shift from labor
to carbon, which essentially means using the carbon fund to reduce labor taxes. A fourth examines the effects of a direct
consumer subsidy by the carbon fund to stimulate diffusion of green products. As a ﬁfth CPP, we consider a carbon tax with
revenues spent on green procurement. A ﬁnal CPP undertakes all these policies simultaneously. The selection of these CPPs
is motivated by recent discussions about effective climate policies and recycling of carbon tax revenues ( Carl and Fedor,
2016 ; Baranzini et al., 2017 ; Cramton et al., 2017 ; Meckling et al., 2017 ; Stiglitz et al., 2017 ), which have however not yet
been systematically tested using agent-based models. We will investigate the policy packages in terms of environmental and
economic performance. Environmental performance will focus on the time patterns of carbon intensity of production, and
cumulative CO 2 emissions as a measure of global warming. Economic indicators include GDP, unemployment and wealth
distribution. This issue is of crucial importance, as carbon pricing is not part of the Paris Climate Agreement, which likely
means it will be rather ineffective in reducing emissions. In fact, it is widely accepted now that the agreement cannot guar-
antee emissions to stay within or even near a carbon budget consistent with its high target of 2 °C warming. According
to a study by Raftery et al. (2017) the expected median temperature rise under the Paris Agreement is 3.2 °C while the
likely range of warming is up to 4.9 °C. In other words, there is an urgent need for robust analysis of climate policies using
realistic assumptions of economic behavior and complexity, as captured by evolutionary macroeconomic models. 
As part of the analysis, we will test the effect of an environmental tax on (un)employment, and address in a new, in-
novative way the well-known “double dividend”, i.e. achieving environment and employment goals, of environmental tax
revision (e.g., Fullerton and Metcalf, 1997 ; de Mooij, 1999 ; Bosello et al., 2001 ; Freire-González and Ho, 2018 ). This debate1 Labor productivity is equivalent to total factor productivity in this model since we work with a Leontief-type production function, as explained later. 
We use the term labor productivity throughout the article in relation to technological change that advances the performance of physical capital of ﬁrms 
(i.e., machinery and equipment), thereby reducing the demand for labor. 
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 has been largely waged over general equilibrium effects under rationality assumptions without explicitly taking into account
innovation impacts, endogenous consumer dynamics and wealth distributions. Here we re-examine its main conclusion that
a double dividend is unlikely. Apart from testing it for bounded rationality and social interactions, our approach will take
into account the dual effect of a tax shift from labor to carbon: (i) providing incentives to ﬁrms to innovate in improvements
in carbon rather than in labor productivity; and (ii) stimulating a shift in household consumption to less carbon-intensive
products and services. The central question is how different the ﬁndings of our approach are compared with those of tradi-
tional economic model studies. 
Our study contributes to the debate on green growth, which so far has not devoted much attention to climate con-
straints, and certainly not from the angle of evolutionary macroeconomic analysis ( Antal and van den Bergh, 2016 ). In this
context, the productivity trap is relevant: higher labor productivity due to innovation results in more unemployment which
is compensated by more demand due to higher wages; but higher wages stimulate further labor productivity rises ( Jackson
and Victor, 2011 ). We can well study this issue in relation to the policy involving a shift of taxes from labor to carbon, ac-
counting for two types of innovation, namely affecting carbon and labor productivities. The question is whether this results
in a double dividend, that is, a reduction in emissions along with an increase in employment. According to a recent sur-
vey by Freire-González (2018) the evidence on this is rather divided. Hence, it is worthwhile to also study this topic using
agent-based modeling, as done here. 
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the general structure of the agent-based model
used and clariﬁes unique features in comparison with similar model approaches. In Section 3 we discuss the environmental-
climate extension of this model, deﬁne the policy scenarios and select performance indicators. Section 4 presents the simu-
lation results and provides interpretations of these. Section 5 concludes. 
2. The basic evolutionary macroeconomic model 
The basic model we later extend encompasses a full macro-economy that evolves from bottom-up according to agent-
based methodology ( Tesfatsion and Judd, 2006 ; Gilbert, 2007 ), building upon the framework presented in Rengs and Scholz-
Wäckerle (2014 , 2017 , 2019 ). It includes the following sectors: households, ﬁrms producing consumption and capital goods,
banks, central bank and government. All sectors are disaggregated, except central bank and government, in the sense that
they are composed of a multitude of agents and their interactive dynamic relations. Our model is close in spirit to recent
evolutionary macroeconomic models by Dosi et al. (2010) , Ciarli et al. (2010) , Cincotti et al. (2010) , Delli Gatti et al. (2011) ,
Seppecher (2012) , Lengnick (2013) , Riccetti et al. (2013) , Chen et al. (2014) , Dawid et al. (2014) , Lorentz et al. (2016) , Caiani
et al. (2016) and Safarzynska and van den Bergh (2016) . The model is able to generate emergence of specialization patterns
of ﬁrms in terms of needs and wants aspirations of consumers, as shown in Rengs and Scholz-Wäckerle (2019) . To illustrate,
a ﬁrm produces goods that may initially serve just basic needs, and over time shift endogenously to serving the want
aspirations of heterogeneous households. This avoids the more common approach of starting with a ﬁxed classiﬁcation of
ﬁrms or sectors with particular goods that permanently retain their character. 
The social mediation of preferences – via signaling-by-consuming as empirically validated by Heffetz (2011) – steers
consumer demand in this macroeconomic agent-based model, taking the form of imitation (bandwagon effects) or status
seeking behavior, depending on the particular consumer class. In the case of status-seeking behavior, we consider Veblen
effects (conspicuous consumption) and snob effects; both imply a focus on luxury goods, but while the ﬁrst is about expen-
sive, the second is related to rare goods ( Leibenstein 1950 ). Because of the population structure consisting of different agent
groups, including for consumers and ﬁrms, the model can generate co-evolutionary changes in behaviors and institutions
( van den Bergh and Stagl, 2003 ; Hodgson, 2006 ; Dopfer and Potts, 2008 ; Wäckerle, 2014 ). 
A detailed analytical description of the base model is contained in Rengs and Scholz-Wäckerle (2019) . In what follows,
we introduce ﬁrst an overview of the different types of agents, namely households, ﬁrms, the banking system (commercial
banks and a central bank), and the government. 
2.1. Households 
Households do not optimize their consumption behavior but are instead assumed to be rather loyal in their choice of
vendors, while also being open to new opportunities that arise. Their decisions (namely, which ﬁrms’ products to buy) are
linked to two differently motivational aspirations, one for needs and the other for wants. The tendency to buy from a speciﬁc
ﬁrm then is contingent on the respective aspiration, the current product’s relative price and ﬁrm reputation, in turn depend-
ing on the ﬁrm’s market shares. The latter two are based on well-documented consumer behaviors: bandwagon, Veblen and
snob effects ( Leibenstein 1950 ). The consumption decision differs with respect to social class and income group as em-
pirically observed and documented by Veblen (1899) , validated by Bourdieu (1984) , recently tested by Heffetz (2011) and
extensively discussed by Trigg (2001) and Wright (2015) . In our model, we differentiate between capitalist households,
wealthy workers and (other) workers (see Rengs and Scholz-Wäckerle, 2019 ). Capitalist households and wealthy workers
have a higher saving rate than workers who spend a larger share of their budget on satisfying needs aspiration, following
Engel’s law ( Chai and Moneta 2010 ; Heffetz 2011 ). Changes of social class are possible and endogenous: capitalists may go
bankrupt, wealthy workers may found a ﬁrm, etc. Eventually, workers, wealthy workers and capitalists are characterized by
distinct preferences and behaviors. 
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Fig. 1. Social interactions and associated signaling-by-consuming effects dependent on social class. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 We model Veblenian consumer dynamics in a similar manner as Kapeller and Schütz (2015) but with substantially more
details about differences in quantity and price effects as well as about the underlying social dynamics. Additionally, we
employ a snob effect that roughly represents Bourdieu’s (1984) model of trickle-around ( Trigg 2001 ). Snob consumption is
modeled as pure distinction, that is, the opposite of the bandwagon effect. This distinction is crucial for our setting, because
it avoids potential lock-in due to market dynamics. As a result of this approach, even already established ﬁrms may crash
after many years, giving rise to a market restructuring of the economy. 
According to Leibenstein (1950 : 205), there are four possible combinations of consumption behavior, dependent on price
(normal price and Veblen effect) and ﬁrm reputation (bandwagon and snob effect). We extend his framework by including
needs and wants aspirations as well as social class. This results in connecting aspiration (wants and needs) to social class
(workers, wealthy workers, capitalists), as illustrated graphically in Fig. 1 . Workers’ consumption for satisfying the needs
aspirations has a high normal price effect (indicating a strong preference for the cheap over the expensive) and a low
bandwagon effect. Workers imitate the behavior of all consumers with a needs aspiration. Workers’ wants aspirations have
a low normal price effect (indicating a weak preference for the cheap over the expensive) and a high bandwagon effect;
see Heffetz (2011) for an empirical test of income elasticity vs. visibility across different income groups. In particular, they
imitate capitalists’ wants aspirations. Whereas wealthy workers follow the same bandwagon, they further show a weak
Veblen effect in consumption, i.e., weakly preferring the expensive over the cheap. Finally, needs of capitalists, including
ﬁrms and bank owners, are triggered partially by a snob effect (i.e., searching for rare goods – inverted imitation) and
partially by a normal price effect. Capitalists’ wants work similarly, with the same partial snob effect but additionally with
a Veblen effect, as they prefer the expensive over the cheap. In view of this, consumption takes the form of a co-evolving
process between behaviors of consumers and social structure. 
Households choose their seller in a boundedly rational way, by having a short list of preferred “vendors” at any given
time ( Lengnick, 2013 ). They try to buy equal amounts from each ﬁrm on their list, as ﬁrms’ stock and household budgets
permit. Households actually employ two lists, one for needs and one for wants. Initially, each of these lists consists of n
randomly chosen ﬁrms. During the simulation, households change the composition of these lists based on their preferences,
slowly improving them in each round. As preferences are assumed to be different for needs and wants, these two lists will
tend to comprise different ﬁrms. In the case of needs aspirations, households replace a ﬁrm that did not deliver – because
of insuﬃcient production or inventory – by another, randomly chosen one. In the case of wants consumption, households
do not immediately replace a ﬁrm that could not deliver, as it indicates a highly sought after good. Instead, they wait up to
three months before randomly choosing a new one. 
If a seller (ﬁrm) is considered for potential replacement and is perceived to be better (by some small but noticeable
degree) in terms of price and ﬁrm reputation (implying a utility premium for a household consuming its good) than the
one selected for potential elimination from the list, the replacement is effectuated. These lists are updated every period
by considering a random ﬁrm that is not yet part of the shortlist. Next, the utilities are compared of purchasing from this
speciﬁc ﬁrm with that of purchasing from a random ﬁrm on the shortlist. This difference depends on the households’ social
class and consumption aspiration as previously described (for more details, see Rengs and Scholz-Wäckerle 2019 ). 
An individual can changes its social class: e.g., capitalists may go bankrupt with their ﬁrm, or wealthy workers may found
a ﬁrm. As such class changes tend not to be recognized immediately by society, they happen in the model with a time lag
(set at three months). 
Workers, wealthy workers and capitalists have different pref erences and behaviors, as highlighted in Fig. 1 . Worker
consumption has a high normal price effect (indicating a strong preference for the cheap over the expensive) and a low
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 bandwagon effect. Workers imitate the behavior of all needs consumers. Worker want aspirations have a low normal price
effect (indicating a weak preference for the cheap over the expensive) and a high bandwagon effect (they imitate the cap-
italist wants aspirations), while wealthy workers follow the same bandwagon and consume showing a weak Veblen effect
(i.e., they weakly prefer the expensive over the cheap). 
Finally, capitalist (ﬁrm and bank owners’) needs are triggered partially by a snob effect (searching for rare goods –
inverted imitation) and partially by a normal price effect. Capitalist wants work with the same partial snob effect but ad-
ditionally with a Veblen effect (they prefer the expensive over the cheap). Consumption behavior is thus not static but a
co-evolving process between behaviors of consumers and the social structure. 
As indicated before, our model households employ shortlists of preferred ﬁrms for each consumption case. These lists are
updated every period by considering a random ﬁrm, not yet part of the shortlist, and comparing the utility of purchasing
from this speciﬁc ﬁrm with that of purchasing from a random ﬁrm on the shortlist. This evaluation follows the behav-
ioral modes (as described above and sketched in Fig. 1 ) and thus differs for the household social class and consumption
aspiration. The following equations show how utility is derived for the worker needs in period t : 
b 1 ,i,t = 
(
p max,t − p i,t 
p max,t − p min,t 
)
(1) 
b 2 , j,t = 
(
m max,t − m j,t 
m max, t − m min,t 
)
(2) 
b 3 ,i,t = 
(
v i,t − v min,t 
v max,t − v min,t 
)
(3) 
U i, j,t = b 1 ,i,t b 2 , j,t ξ + b 3 ,i,t ( 1 − ξ ) (4) 
Here i denotes a ﬁrm, j denotes the household and t the time period. The symbol b 1, i, t represents the ﬁrm’s normalized
relative price in comparison to the prices of all other ﬁrms and b 2, j, t denotes the household’s normalized relative wealth in
relation to all other households. Furthermore, b 3, i, t stands for the ﬁrm’s normalized reputation, while v is calculated from
ﬁrms’ past sales; in this illustrative case of needs aspirations of workers, it directly corresponds to ﬁrms’ market shares
to reﬂect the bandwagon effect. Finally utility U i, j, t is composed of the price component b 1, i, t weighted with the relative
wealth b 1, j, t and the weight parameter ξ , plus the ﬁrm’s reputation weighted by ( 1 − ξ ) . Thereby parameter ξ controls for
the price effect. The remaining three cases of wants aspirations of worker classes, and needs as well as wants aspirations of
capitalists are deﬁned similarly, as discussed in Appendix 3 . 
In this respect we follow on the one hand Veblen’s general suggestion of trickle-down effects in social structure
( Trigg, 2001 ) due to working class consumers imitating capitalist class consumers. On the other hand, we are inspired by
Leibenstein (1950) , who speciﬁed consumption dynamics as resembling a bandwagon effect (imitation of other consumers)
and contrasted it to the status-seeking Veblen effect (luxury consumption) and snob effect (consum ption striving for rare
goods – “exclusiveness”). Consumption behavior is thus a dynamic interplay between individual aspirations (needs/wants), 
status-seeking behavior, wealth and imitation, dependent on emergent social structure driven by interactive evolution of
populations of different classes of consumers. 
2.2. Firms 
A second group of agents are ﬁrms, which produce ﬁnal goods using inputs of capital and labor. They employ a ﬁrm-
speciﬁc production technology, with respect to either labor or carbon productivity (the latter causing a reduction of emis-
sions per output unit), being heterogeneous among ﬁrms. Firms start with a number of differently scheduled credits (each
with their own duration) emulating the reinvestment necessary to uphold the constant capital level to counter depreciation.
They can apply for loans at banks operating in a credit market to increase or maintain production capacity. Goods-producing
ﬁrms acquire capital from a single ﬁrm that produces capital goods. Physical capital is complementary to the production
factor of labor. Proﬁts made by the capital goods ﬁrm are distributed to households in relative proportion to their accumu-
lated wealth. However, technology, i.e. the means of production, remains in the hands of the capitalists and the wealthiest
workers. Every month, a full production cycle up to delivery to ﬁnal demand is achieved as one period (time step) in the
simulation. 
The initial ﬁrm population starts with randomly (using a uniform probability distribution) assigned workers, resulting
in slightly heterogeneous ﬁrms in terms of numbers of workers. These are then assigned a matching physical capital stock,
in accordance with labor productivity and start with homogenous production technology. Every round each ﬁrm adjusts its
production by monitoring the level of goods left in the inventory after sales. If sales exceed expectations, i.e., the inventory
contains less than the targeted reserve stock ( Godley and Lavoie, 2012 ), the ﬁrm decides to increase its output. The reserve
stock is calculated by multiplying the ﬁrm’s sales in the previous period by the production reserve stock rate. Unsold stock
depreciates over time since “old” goods are more diﬃcult to sell over time. Prices are adjusted analogously to production,
i.e., in relation to the level of under- or overestimation of sales. They are changed by small amounts and never fall below
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 the estimated marginal cost per unit of output plus some mark-up. If the planned production requires more physical capital
than available, the ﬁrm tries to get a loan to buy the additional machinery. Moreover, innovation takes the form of upgrades
of machinery which are supplied by the capital goods ﬁrm. The analytical apparatus of those mechanisms is described in
Eqs. (6) and ( 11 ) in detail. 
Otherwise the ﬁrm maintains its current capital stock, since it cannot reduce it actively in this model, as opposed to
the input of labor, which can be adjusted by hiring or ﬁring workers, although with some delay ( η1 ). An interpretation of
this could be protection by labor laws, conform Seppecher (2012) , who offers an agent-based macro implementation of this
mechanism where wages have to be paid two more months as a protection against dismissal, thus decreasing the effective
production capacity. Otherwise, physical capital depreciates annually so that the ﬁrm will need to reinvest if it desires to
maintain the current level of physical capital. The proﬁts of the ﬁrm accumulate in its current account over a whole ﬁscal
year (12 months). At the end of the year funds are set aside for research and development (R&D) investments and corporate
taxes are applied to the remaining amount. The rest is transferred to the ﬁrm owners. Also at the end of each year, ﬁrms
with positive proﬁts increase wages based on the increase of consumer prices, whereas ﬁrms without or with negative
proﬁts keep wages constant. In other words, wages are downward rigid. 
Firms make their investment decision based on their estimated proﬁt rate, deﬁned as the ratio between proﬁt and phys-
ical capital. The estimated proﬁt of the ﬁrm is given by expected revenues minus current wages, interest payments, ﬁxed
credit repayments and expected additional credit costs. 2 If their estimated proﬁt rate exceeds the interest rate of their bank,
the bank will guarantee a loan with a ﬁxed duration and a ﬁxed interest rate. Moreover, banks only grant additional credit if
the sum of unrepaid credit of that ﬁrm is smaller than the ﬁrm’s production capital. If the proﬁt rate is too low or the debt-
to-equity ratio is too high, the speciﬁc ﬁrm has to reduce its production output as much as possible. Obviously, if the proﬁts
become too low the ﬁrm needs to ﬁre workers and reduce capital inputs, which together will lead to lower production
output. In the process, ﬁrms may go bankrupt, in which case capitalist households owning the ﬁrm become unemployed. 
Every period one new ﬁrm can be founded, with a low probability, by the wealthiest worker household, who then
changes it social class from working to capitalist class once the ﬁrm is operative. On founding, the owner of the new ﬁrm
endows the ﬁrm with an operating budget for the ﬁrst quarter and invests in initial machinery. The former is fully ﬁnanced
out of the households budget, while the latter is equally ﬁnanced out of own budget and ﬁrm credits. If the household does
not have enough savings to ﬁnance its part of the investment, the bank grants it a form of private credit (overdraft on its
account). This is used as a proxy for risky private investment, and results in private debt which the owner cannot trans-
fer to the ﬁrm. Newly founded ﬁrms start with production and emission reduction technologies that represent the average
technology of the current ﬁrm population. 
2.3. Banking system 
Next we consider commercial banks and the central bank, which serve various roles in the model. Banks keep current
accounts for ﬁrms, the capital goods ﬁrm and households (allowing for deﬁcits) and savings accounts for households. In
addition, they grant ﬁrm loans. They pay and charge interest for these different ﬁnancial services applying distinct rates,
limited by central bank interest rates, which are hold constant over the whole course of the simulation. Banks have to
reﬁnance themselves, by monitoring assets (loans) and liabilities (savings). If banks lack liquidity they request loans at the
central bank. 
The central bank keeps current accounts for the government (including overdraft functionality) and banks, as well as
deposit facilities for banks, involving the paying or charging of interest. Furthermore it acts as a lender of last resort, but for
the presented simulation experiments it does not accommodate any monetary policies. 
2.4. Government 
The government serves various roles in the model. It makes social transfers to unemployed and retired households. A
constant share of the agent population is set to retired, receiving a ﬁxed pension every month. These agents generally
represent the largest group of households who are out of the labor force, but depend for their survival on social transfers.
Note that we do’ not assume any demographic processes that make young people become pensioners; instead, as most other
agent-based model studies, we just assume the pre-existence of the two groups. Furthermore, the government collects taxes
on labor, income and capital gains, on corporate proﬁts made by banks and ﬁrms and the capital good ﬁrm, and on the
value-added of sales (taxes are ﬁxed over the whole course of the simulation). The government budget in the model is
never perfectly in balance because of uncertainty about both tax revenues and government expenditures – as is the case in
reality. As unemployment beneﬁts and pensions are downward rigid, the government has no means to cut costs and has to
deﬁcit spend if necessary. If indebted, it pays interest to banks and households (in relation to their wealth) as a proxy for
government bonds. 2 See Rengs and Scholz-Wäckerle (2019 – Section 3.1.) for more detailed description of how production is modeled. Note that the chosen notation of the 
variables, symbols, indexations and equations here follows the notation choices in that publication. 
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 3. Extension of the model for climate policy analysis 
The environmental or more precisely climate extension of the previously described agent-based model involves a number
of elements: 
- describing CO 2 emissions during the processes that ﬁrms employ to produce goods, 
- describing environmental innovations and its effects on carbon intensity, emissions and employment. 
- policies to curb emissions through behavioral changes by all agents, environmental innovation or a mixture of these
channels. These include carbon taxation, environmental tax revision (shifting taxes from labor to carbon), producer and
consumer subsidies, green procurement, and a combination of these. 
The general structure of this extended model is provided in Fig. 2 . 
Each ﬁrm ( i ) emits CO 2 over the course of the production process every round ( t ) depending on the employed emission
reduction technology ( a z 
i,t 
), where z i, t represents the actual carbon dioxide emissions dependent on produced commodi-
ties q i, t . 
z i,t = q i,t a z i,t (5) 
Initially, only half of the ﬁrm population possesses emission reduction technology. The emissions per output (carbon
intensity as a measure of pollution) can alter over time through innovation in carbon productivity (“green innovation”).
Investment in R&D leading to innovation is assumed to have an immediate effect either on carbon or on labor productivity
of the respective ﬁrm’s output. In other words, innovation is an individual process with a small role given to spillovers, a
side effect of R&D. Since there are two different technology branches (carbon vs. labor productivity), both may beneﬁt from
spillovers. The extent of spillover is proportional to the total amount of R&D, while the highest spillover effect will occur if
all ﬁrms perform research on the same technology branch, and achieving a much higher improvement in technology than
without spillovers. The existence of spillover indicates that knowledge creation regarding energy eﬃciency is relatively easily
transferred between sectors. 
Our model does not account for climate change and its feedback to the economy, causing economic costs in terms of lost
production (e.g., in agriculture), damage to infrastructure and buildings due to extreme climate events, increased resource
scarcity (water), health effects, etc. This is the focus of long-term climate-economy models like DICE, FUND and PAGE. Our
approach remains close to climate policy assessment models, which often use a general equilibrium format ( Jorgenson et al.,
2008 ; Söderholm, 2007 ). 
Climate policies generally will raise prices for both more and less carbon-intensive goods and services. While these are
subject to normal demand responses (less demand for higher price), higher prices of goods produced by processes with a
lower carbon intensity (“greener goods”) may in the short run attract conspicuous consumers. These then act in accordance
with the Veblen (wealthy consumers looking for expensive goods that provide status) or snob effect (capitalists that look
for rare goods; some small ﬁrms may innovate and offer a small amount of “green goods”). All other consumer classes will
slowly, in the medium run, imitate these richer classes (bandwagon effect). 
3.1. Emission reduction and adoption of low-carbon technologies by ﬁrms 
As indicated, ﬁrms can improve either through labor productivity (labor input per unit of output) or carbon productivity
(carbon emissions per unit of output), the latter depends on the current level of the ﬁrm’s emission reduction technology.
The former is part of the simple Leontief-type production function of the base model ( q i, t ), and is endogenously adjusted
by the ﬁrm ( a i, t ), thus increasing output for given capital ( x 
c 
i,t 
) and labor input ( x l 
i,t 
) measured in number of workers, times
the labor productivity parameter ( α7 ): 
q i,t = a i,t min 
(
x c i,t , x 
l 
i,t α7 
)
(6) 
These two options are exclusive, with the ﬁrm decision about which type of R&D to invest in depending on past perfor-
mance (proﬁts). Basically this decision heuristic relies on a simple proﬁt comparison among a chosen subset of ﬁrms. Firms
consider a small number of their competitors (randomly chosen each year) ( k ) and compare the annual proﬁt-rate of these
ﬁrms at the end of a ﬁscal year ( r a 
i,t 
), which corresponds to the proﬁt accrued ( π i, t ) in relation to the average current value
of the production capital ( x c 
i,t 
) over the last 12 periods. 
r a i,t = 
∑ t 
n = t−11 πi,n 
1 
12 
∑ t 
n = t−11 x 
c 
i,n 
(7) 
Every ﬁrm i then evaluates which innovation strategy each of these ( k ) ﬁrms employed and whether they were more or
less successful in terms of proﬁt-rate than ﬁrm i itself. If one of the innovation strategies proved more successful than the
other, then this strategy is adopted by the observing ﬁrm in the next year, independent of the previous strategy. If the situa-
tion is indecisive, then the ﬁrm sticks to its former strategy. As all ﬁrms observe the technology chosen by their competitors
in the past year, ﬁrms can also imitate a strategy that the observed ﬁrms themselves no longer follow. Generally, ﬁrms
engage in research and development only if the costs of R&D ( RC i, t ) are lower than the annual proﬁt ( π
a 
i,t 
= ∑ t n = t−11 πi,n )
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Fig. 2. General structure of the modeled artiﬁcial economy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 retained after paying corporate taxes τ 1 ) and the dividend emitted to the owner. To keep the ﬁrm operational, these retained
proﬁts either cover a number of periods (equal to the length of the protection against dismissal) of total costs ( η1 TC i, t ) as a
crude measure to absorb unexpected market disruptions, or the ﬁrm’s proﬁt net of taxes if it was lower, thus: 
R C i,t ≤ min 
(
η1 T C i,t , π
a 
i,t ( 1 − τ1 ) 
)
(8)
If the retained proﬁts are lower than the R&D costs, the ﬁrm has to apply for a loan that is conditional on the usual
lending constraints (see Eqs. (19–21) in Rengs and Scholz-Wäckerle 2019 ). The costs of R&D are the same for both strategies
(general and green innovation), deﬁned as a ﬁxed fraction of the ﬁrm’s current production capital. The costs can be ﬁnanced
partly by retained proﬁts and partly by loans, should proﬁts not suﬃce to cover the costs. This reﬂects the reality that
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 some (notably large, established or successful) ﬁrms ﬁnance their innovation completely out of proﬁts, while others (notably
starters) fully depend for this on loans, while a third category will combine the two funding sources. 
Innovation takes the form of upgrades of machinery, which is bought at the end of the year and is effective immediately
at the beginning of the new ﬁscal year (bought from the capital goods ﬁrm). The cost of technological innovation is based
on the ﬁrm’s capital stock ( x c 
i,t 
) and a fraction ( κ) of the capital ﬁrm’s current price for new capital/machinery ( c c t ): 
R C i,t = x c i,t c c t κ (9) 
We assume that investing in R&D can lead either to an increase in the labor productivity coeﬃcient, or to a decrease
in the carbon productivity coeﬃcient, by a factor ζ 1 . The carbon productivity depends on the ﬁrm’s current coeﬃcient of
emission reduction technology, starting with 1 for the whole ﬁrm population. Improvements in carbon productivity lower
the emission reduction coeﬃcient in the direction of a (technically non-reachable) minimum of 0. To simulate the increasing
technical diﬃculties and costs of reducing emissions per output unit, we assume that consecutive reduction of emissions
gets less effective in a non-linear way. That is, the more effective the emission reduction technology that a ﬁrm currently
employs already is, the smaller the next improvement from its R&D efforts will be. This is in line with the widely accepted
assumption in economic analysis of environmental policy that marginal abatement costs are rising with the level of abate-
ment. Arguably, this derives from cost-minimizing ranking of abatement options. Furthermore all R&D efforts are subject
to an early mover advantage for both R&D branches, which is formalized as a late mover disadvantage. R&D success gets
discounted over time by a parameter ζ 3 , as given in Eqs. (10) and ( 11 ). The longer the ﬁrm waits to invest in R&D, the
lower will be the productivity gain. Thus, if ﬁrm i invests in emission reduction R&D in a given year, it would change its
coeﬃcient representing emission reduction through technology ( a z 
i,t 
) to: 
a z i,t = a z i,t−1 
( 
1 − ζ1 
( 
1 + ζ2 N 
f 
z,t 
N f t 
) ) 
( 1 − ζ3 ) 
t 
12 (10) 
With ζ 2 representing the maximum spillover effect, if all ﬁrms ( N 
f 
t ) would engage in this R&D branch in t (with N 
f 
z,t 
representing the number of ﬁrms engaged in emission reduction). Likewise, if a ﬁrm invests in R&D on labor productivity,
its production technology would improve in terms of output generated per unit of labor input: 
a i,t = a i,t−1 + 
( 
1 − ζ1 
( 
1 + ζ2 N 
f 
a,t 
N f t 
) ) 
( 1 − ζ3 ) 
t 
12 (11) 
In this context it is assumed that ﬁrms are indifferent towards improving their carbon footprint without additional in-
centives. 
3.2. Climate policies: carbon taxation, environmental tax revision, producer and consumer subsidies, and green procurement 
To stimulate reduction of emissions by ﬁrms, the government can implement a price incentive via carbon taxes. The total
revenues of these ( T z t ) are the product of emitted units of carbon ( z i, n ) times the per unit carbon tax ( τ 2 ). These revenues
accumulate in a “carbon fund” during the ﬁscal year – Eq. (12) shows the sum of the last ( t − 11 ) periods till period t
therefore –, which is used to fund a number of policy instruments that are carried out in the following ﬁscal year, described
in a later section. 
T z t = 
t ∑ 
n = t−11 
N f n ∑ 
i =1 
z i,n τ2 (12) 
The above mentioned carbon tax revenues are dedicated to ﬁnance the other climate policy instruments. In other words,
the government budget is neutral and thus not a relevant criteria for comparing distinct climate policy packages. 
Additional policy instruments involve the government offering subsidies to households or ﬁrms if they undertake speciﬁc
actions. As the government has to announce the amount of subsidies granted before households and ﬁrms take decisions (as
they will base their decision on the extent of the subsidy), it does not know how many subsidies will actually be requested
every month. Therefore it needs to estimate the amount to be paid per subsidy on a monthly basis. To do so it bases the
estimate for this period’s (a month) number of requested subsidies on the number of subsidies paid in the previous period.
This may cause a cyclical movement of budget deﬁcits and surpluses (i.e., under/overshooting the carbon tax fund) on a
monthly basis but leads to a nearly balanced carbon tax fund budget on a yearly basis. 
The government can thus employ various policy instruments to either reinforce or complement the effect of the primary
climate policy (carbon taxes), such as: direct support (subsidies) of green innovation, reducing labor taxes (to encourage
employment creation), product subsidies to consumers to stimulating diffusion of low carbon products, green procurement
or combining these instruments. Since the carbon taxes are collected in the ﬁrst year of simulation for the ﬁrst time, the
additional policy instruments are not applied until the second year. 
Governments can use the subsidy instrument as part of environmental policy. This takes the form of stimulating green
innovations or adoptions (i.e., diffusion of market applications) of environmental technologies, such as renewable energy
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 or more energy-eﬃcient technologies. Innovation subsidies are widely regarded as an instrument of technology policy that
is complementary to carbon taxes, in the sense that they serve largely complementary roles in fostering a transition to a
low-carbon economy. The reason is that carbon taxes alone will select the most cost-effective current technology (e.g., wind
instead of solar PV, or a particular type of PV over another), even if it is uncertain whether this is the best technology in
the long run. To keep a potentially attractive technological trajectory (e.g., solar PV) open, i.e., avoiding early lock-in of a
competing technology that is currently cheaper, one can subsidize R&D into the ﬁrst technology. Private companies typically
underinvest in such R&D as returns on investment are too (s)low or uncertain, implying the need for public support. Formu-
lating a policy package with carbon taxes and innovation subsidies allows us to test to what degree these are complements
or substitutes in an evolutionary multi-agent context. 
Basically the government has two different options to foster a certain technological trajectory or even changing a tech-
nological paradigm, namely “supply-push” and “demand-pull” ( Dosi, 1982 ). The former strategy in our case aims to change
technologies in a more sustainable direction by subsidizing “environmental innovation”. Firms then “push” the technologi-
cal trajectory in a certain innovation direction, and demand is hoped to follow. The second option relates to the idea that
technological change is largely driven (or “pulled” in a certain direction) by the demand side. This takes the form of the
government providing product subsidies to lower consumer prices so as to stimulate the diffusion of less carbon-intensive
products. Since in reality both supply-push and demand-pull mechanisms are continuously at work, in our model we include
both mechanisms and associated policy instruments as well. 
4. Simulation scenarios, settings and results 
The ﬁrst step is to run the model without any policy setting in business-as-usual (Scenario 1 BAU ), which serves as a
reference scenario for assessing the impacts of the following six policy scenarios. 
1. Carbon taxation , i.e., a constant tax per unit of CO 2 emissions (Scenario 2 T ): as the government has no means to reduce
or increase its general spending (unemployment subsidies and pensions) willingly, eventual budget surpluses due to
revenues from the tax are redistributed to all households. As discussed in Section 1 , carbon pricing has received much
attention in recent discussions about effective climate policies. This includes attention for use of carbon tax revenues, as
under the following scenarios. 
2. Subsidizing research and development (Scenario 3 R ): this can take the form of subsidies for more energy-eﬃcient tech-
nologies. The total amount of R&D subsidies provided by the government will be approximately equal to the revenue
of the carbon tax. Individual ﬁrms receive subsidies in relation to their R&D costs, weighted by the effectiveness of the
improvement. Thus, if two ﬁrms have equal R&D costs (i.e., who have the same production capital), the ﬁrm achieving a
higher emission reduction due to R&D receives a higher subsidy. 
3. Labor tax reduction (Scenario 4 L ): this is the much discussed idea of a shift from labor taxes to carbon (CO 2 ) taxes. It
is intended to alter the incentives for innovation from stimulating improvements in labor to carbon productivity, with
potentially beneﬁcial effects for both the environment and the labor market (less unemployment). 
4. Consumer product adoption subsidy (Scenario 5 C ): a subsidy to lower consumer prices to encourage adoption of less
carbon-intensive products, aimed at stimulating their rapid diffusion. 
5. Green procurement (Scenario 6 P ): the government buys (green) goods with a relatively low carbon intensity. This is
operationalized by letting the government search randomly half of the population of ﬁrms producing relatively clean
products, and sorting them according to carbon intensity. The lower the distance to the cleanest ﬁrm, the more the
government purchases (so that it buys the most from the cleanest product). 
6. A combination of all of the above mentioned instruments of climate policy (Scenario 7 ALL ): in particular, we consider
the case of carbon tax revenues being divided in equal parts among the other climate policy instruments. 
All simulations start in a comparable initial situation in t = 0 (before regular simulation) and are then subject to a shock
through the introduction of the policies in the ﬁrst simulated month. 
4.1. Simulation settings 
The following section presents results of a simulation experiment implementing the described macroeconomic multi-
agent model. Simulations were run with 50 0 0 households, ﬁve banks, one government, a central bank and initially started
with 250 ﬁrms. The experiment was set up to simulate all combinations of the seven policy scenarios described above
with multiple levels of a carbon tax. To investigate the effectivity and repercussions of policies we choose three different
equidistantly spaced tax levels, which we refer to as low, medium and high (2.5%, 6.25% and 10% of the initial mean price,
respectively). Each of the 19 resulting combinations (i.e., one BAU and six policies with three tax levels) was simulated 100
times with different seeds to account for variations in random factors and render the obtained results more robust. R e -runs
of identical policy/tax combinations generally varied only slightly – due to stochasticity – underpinning high robustness of
the results. Each of these 1900 runs was simulated for 360 time steps, representing months, resulting in a simulated time
horizon of 30 years. 3 3 See Table A.1 in Appendix 1 for a list showing the timing of monthly and annual simulation events. 
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 Appendix 2 provides an overview of the main common simulation parameters used in the experiment, which were held
constant for all simulations. As one might expect, changes in the value of the maximum ﬁrm’s debt-to-equity ratio param-
eter have a large inﬂuence on the economic system. In the presented simulations this parameter value was chosen so that
banks would only grant a loan if the sum of open loans would not exceed half of the ﬁrm’s production capital after granting
the potential loan. Thus, banks follow a conservative policy in granting loans. As a consequence, newly founded ﬁrms can
only grow slowly. We decided to keep this parameter constant at the given level, resulting into a stable ﬁnancial economic
setting that does not distort our central simulation experiment on climate policy. 
4.2. Simulation results 
Simulation results are presented below in a format that allows direct comparison of the six policy scenarios described
in the previous section. The ﬁgures with results show annual aggregates for a number of central macroeconomic measures
of the artiﬁcial economies. Each line in the following graphs represents the mean of all simulations for a speciﬁc policy/tax
combination, with the BAU scenario shown as a dot-dashed line. Subﬁgures represent the effects of applying the speciﬁc
policy with different tax levels. 
As can be seen in all the ﬁgures, the ﬁrst 5–10 years of a simulation run involves an adaption process. The reason is that
the initial preferred vendor lists of households contain random ﬁrms and so does not yet reﬂect households’ preferences.
Hence, households change their preferred ﬁrms, thus inﬂuencing the attractiveness of the ﬁrm for other households, caus-
ing a lagged cycle of adaptions, decreasing in intensity after some years, though never reaching an equilibrium state. The
introduction of climate policies creates a disequilibrating effect, the strength of which depends on the tax level. This causes
adaptions of the market during some transition period. As this affects environment and welfare, it is necessary to show and
assess this adaption phase. 
In the following we ﬁrst take a look at the effectiveness of each policy scenario in reducing emissions, and subsequently
assess the economic effects that these policies have. Introduction of the discussed policy packages has rather strong effects
on our artiﬁcial economy, with those policies that directly or indirectly inﬂuence households’ purchasing power (namely,
L, C and ALL ) having the strongest impacts. The latter effectively lead to an increase of household budgets, thus increasing
the aspiration for wants. This effect negatively compensates for the positive environmental effect of the introduction of the
carbon tax, causing the net beneﬁcial effect to be smaller. 
Fig. 3 shows the total CO 2 emissions of the initial economy. 
4 For low tax levels only the R scenario reduces total emis-
sions signiﬁcantly after 10 years. However, in the long run all policies lead to slight improvements compared to the base
scenario, with C, T and L scenarios being almost at par with the base scenario at the end of the simulation. For higher tax
levels all scenarios quickly fare better than the base scenario, with the L scenario having the smallest and the R scenario
having the largest effects. Overall the R scenario performs very well at reducing emissions, even though for high taxes the
C scenario reduces emissions to a similar degree. 
Low levels of emissions under scenario C result from a fall in GDP and come at a high cost of increasing unemployment
as can be seen in later ﬁgures. Fig. 4 shows the annual development of carbon intensity, corrected for consumer price
inﬂation, i.e., emissions/real GDP. The R scenario is the only climate policy package effectively lowering carbon intensity
below the BAU level throughout the whole simulation time, at all the three tested carbon tax levels. All other scenarios
result into higher levels of carbon intensity compared to BAU . Furthermore, the simulation experiments show that higher4 The shaded areas around the timelines in Fig. 3 (and the following ﬁgures) indicate the 0.05 and 0.95 percentiles, respectively, of all simulation results 
rather than indicating standard deviations, as simulation results are not necessarily normally distributed. As expected, these narrow bands slightly increase 
as the simulation progresses, as individual simulation runs take slightly different paths. 
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Fig. 5. Kernel density estimates of the distribution of emission reduction technology under each policy scenario for the high tax level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 tax levels do not necessarily lead to lower carbon intensities, except in the R scenario. These counterintuitive ﬁndings are
explained through a higher costs for ﬁrms, especially under medium and high carbon taxes. In the R scenario these costs
are compensated through R&D subsidies provided to ﬁrms. 
The bad performance of scenarios T, L, C and P in carbon intensity results from investment problems at the medium
and high tax level. Once ﬁrms invest in R&D on carbon productivity, excess demand for green products is likely to result,
initially from capitalists due to the snob effect and subsequently from working class consumers due to the bandwagon effect.
However, this demand cannot be satisﬁed in scenarios T, L, C and P , as green ﬁrms cannot grow quickly enough, due to a
risk-averse banking sector (see parameter φ1 in Appendix 2 , Table A.2). As households try to satisfy their needs and wants
aspirations, they consume carbon-intense products instead. This leads to sharp increases in prices, which takes time, though,
as ﬁrms do not alter prices quickly. Furthermore, these adaptions are imperfect due to the lack in investment activities which
move the economy onto a different path with increasing purchases of carbon-intensive products instead. Eventually, carbon
as well as labor productivity are hold back for medium and high tax levels, unless environmental innovation gets suﬃciently
subsidized as is the case in scenario R , where we see carbon intensity decreasing compared to BAU. 
Fig. 5 shows the evolution of carbon emitted per unit of output (or the emission reduction technology) by ﬁrms over
time for the high tax level only (but all tax levels produce similar patterns). The sub-ﬁgures show kernel density estima-
tions of emission technology at equidistant points in simulation time, namely 7.5, 15, 22.5 and 30 years. While the ﬁrm
population was initialized with a starkly pronounced bimodal distribution of the effectiveness of reduction technology (to
create minimum diversity, capturing the essence of rich real-world diversity in such technologies), the peaks of the density
distribution slowly drop and move to the left. Most scenarios lead to a very similar distribution (for the same tax level),
with a high number of ﬁrms possessing better reduction technology. The reason is that most climate policy packages do not
lead to higher proﬁt for ﬁrms, whereas we assumed that ﬁrms imitate those with high proﬁts with regard to the innovation
strategy. The exception is the R scenario, in which most ﬁrms choose to invest in R&D on carbon productivity as this policy
results in higher proﬁts of ﬁrms. In contrast, in the ALL scenario a larger number of ﬁrms have medium effective reduction
technologies, which is more pronounced for higher tax levels. The reason is that the other policy components cause demand
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Fig. 6. Real GDP under each policy scenario and tax level. 
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Fig. 7. Unemployment rate under each policy scenario and tax level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 and proﬁt increasing effects from which even ﬁrms producing carbon-intense goods proﬁt, thus reducing the effect of the
R&D subsidies. 
Fig. 6 shows the patterns of real GDP over time. It is measured as the aggregated ﬁnal demand by households and the
government, adjusted by the consumer price index (weighted mean price). Compared to the base scenario, the introduction
of a carbon tax dampens GDP over the entire simulated period for all tax levels. However, for low tax levels, the collected
revenues from this carbon tax can bring back GDP almost to the level of the base scenario, if they are used to ﬁnance R&D
subsidies ( R ). All other policy scenarios perform worse in terms of real GDP than the R scenario. Whereas the difference
between R and the other scenarios is not that large with a low carbon tax, it increases signiﬁcantly at a medium or high
level. We ﬁnd that for a medium and higher tax level the economy gets severely shocked at the moment the tax is intro-
duced (see scenario T ). However, real GDP falls even more once the carbon tax is combined with a consumer subsidy for
less carbon intensive products, or with a reduction in labor taxes or with procurement. These results are surprising and
could not be anticipated from merely observing the assumptions of the model. 
Fig. 7 shows that the unemployment level for the base scenario lies around 10–12% of the labor force, staying steady at
this level over time. The T scenario has the highest unemployment for the whole simulation time, as the carbon tax rev-
enues are not re-invested by the state (but merely redistributed), thus reducing demand due to missing multiplier effects.
The P, C and L scenarios cause higher unemployment for medium and high tax levels. In the latter scenarios unemployment
even increases over time, reaching levels of 15% for a medium carbon tax and levels of 17% for a high carbon tax. The main
reason for the former effect is excess demand that results from the huge shock over demand on the market, due to the
largely increased governmental ( P ) and household ( C ) budgets, which increase demand in total. The L and ALL scenarios
perform slightly better than P and C with regard to unemployment. However, the R scenario performs very well in terms
of employment resulting into lower levels than BAU, as investments in R&D on carbon productivity go at the cost of invest-
ments in R&D on labor productivity, given that each ﬁrm has to choose between the two each year. This stimulates labor
demand, thus increasing consumption above the BAU level. 
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Fig. 9. Quantity of consumption good sales under each policy scenario and tax combination. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Fig. 8 shows consumer price inﬂation, i.e., the composite weighted average price for all goods and services. As can be
immediately seen, all policy scenarios cause at least a somewhat higher price inﬂation than the base case due to the implicit
market interventions. Nevertheless, for R and T scenarios, this effect is very small for all tax levels. The L scenario positively
affects worker households’ budgets, thus boosting demand, but much less than the C scenario. The reason is that the former
increases also savings, whereas the latter scenario exclusively increases the household budget set aside for consumption.
Even though scenario P shows a higher long term increase of price levels than all others, all prices stabilize once the artiﬁcial
economy has adapted to the shock induced by the respective climate policy packages. 
Fig. 9 substantiates the aforementioned results by taking a closer look at market dynamics. It shows the development of
the quantity of consumption good sales. Basically, in our model this measure serves as a proxy for purchasing power. The
higher the relative income/wealth the higher the sales of want goods. As we have already shown, this signiﬁcantly affects
carbon dioxide emissions, especially under scenarios L and C. The reason is that the adaptation process of ﬁrms does not
come about automatically, possibly resulting in the production of fewer carbon-intensive products. For low tax levels, most
scenarios lead to a higher purchasing power of more households, with the exception of the T scenario. Higher tax levels lead
to lower purchasing power for most scenarios compared to the BAU scenario, with the exception of the L scenario, under
which it is higher for the medium tax level. 
As the distribution of wealth in our model is mainly shaped by the sharp distinction between the capitalist and worker
class, with the capitalists starting the simulation with much more wealth than workers, the cumulative share in wealth per
wealth group (Lorenz curve for wealth) is very similar for all scenarios. Fig. 10 illustrates this by showing the evolution of
average capitalists’ wealth in real terms over time. It is found to decrease in comparison with BAU under all scenarios, due
to a redistribution of wealth from the capitalist to the working class. Furthermore the economic situation in all scenarios
at high tax levels is worse than under BAU (compare Fig. 6 ), which leads to lower ﬁrm proﬁts and higher unemployment,
resulting in an additional redistribution effect. Finally, although scenario R outperforms almost all scenarios, it involves the
least redistribution of income from capitalist to working class among all scenarios (though economic inequality is still lower
in R than in BAU ). 
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Fig. 10. Real wealth of capitalists (relative to BAU) under each policy scenario and tax combination. 
Table 1 
An overview of the simulation results. 
Policy scenario 
Indicator Tax level BAU T R L C P ALL 
Total emissions relative to BAU t = 360 after 30 years Low 100% 99.3% 97.9% 99.3% 99.3% 98.9% 98.7% 
Medium 97.6% 94.9% 97.7% 96.0% 96.5% 96.4% 
High 95.8% 92.4% 96.5% 92.2% 94.6% 94.6% 
Carbon intensity (emissions/real GDP) relative to BAU t = 360 
after 30 years 
Low 100% 100.3% 98.2% 100.0% 100.5% 100.4% 99.6% 
Medium 99.9% 95.8% 99.8% 99.6% 99.7% 99.0% 
High 100.6% 94.7% 100.4% 99.5% 100.2% 98.5% 
Real GDP relative to BAU t = 360 after 30 years Low 100% 99.1% 99.5% 98.8% 98.8% 98.7% 98.9% 
Medium 97.0% 98.6% 96.6% 95.1% 95.5% 96.6% 
High 94.8% 97.3% 94.5% 90.9% 92.9% 94.8% 
Relative change in unemployment over the simulated period Low 11.8% 13.2% 11.6% 12.4% 12.1% 12.6% 12.2% 
Medium 16.0% 11.0% 14.0% 14.9% 15.5% 13.5% 
High 19.0% 11.9% 16.3% 19.1% 18.7% 15.3% 
Relative change in consumer prices over the simulated period Low 119.5% 122.0% 121.0% 124.5% 124.8% 125.1% 123.8% 
Medium 126.8% 123.7% 133.4% 141.2% 140.4% 133.2% 
High 135.5% 128.5% 147.5% 168.8% 159.1% 144.6% 
Notes: (1) the scenario names represent: T – carbon tax, R – R&D subsidy, L – reducing labor taxes, C – subsidy for consumers to adopt low-carbon option, 
and P – green procurement, and ALL – a combination of all previous instruments. (2) Bold faced percentages indicate the best performances. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 1 shows signiﬁcant differences in the performance of economic and environmental factors for most of the scenarios
and tax levels. The table summarizes simulation results for the end time, i.e., at 30 years or t = 360 , for total emissions,
carbon intensity and real GDP in relative differences to the BAU scenario, in the ﬁrst three rows. Moreover, Table 1 shows
relative changes in unemployment and consumer prices over the whole course of the simulation (i.e., between t = 0 and
t = 360 ) in the last two rows. The overall striking result is given by the performance of the R scenario which is able to
outperform every other scenario at all tax levels for the economic and environmental measures in focus. 
Overall, these results are generally in line with climate policy experiments performed in Gerst et al. (2013) where sub-
sidizing research and development in emission reduction technology is also highlighted as a perfect complementary policy
funded by the revenues of a carbon tax. However – as previously shown – the presented evolutionary macroeconomic model
allows a unique computational analysis since it can address implications of economic heterogeneity and diversity along mi-
cro, meso and macro levels (compare Rengs and Scholz-Wäckerle 2019 ) for all the investigated climate policy packages. We
have looked particularly into the effects of these packages on ﬁrm adaptation patterns and on heterogeneous household
behavior governed by the social mediation of preferences. Thus we have been able to investigate also the political economy
effects on the distribution of wealth dependent on different climate policy packages. 
5. Conclusions 
An evolutionary macroeconomic model of a one-country closed economy was developed to study climate policy packages.
The model accounts for a variety of observed behavioral features of consumers, such as imitation, status and snob effects.
The model describes interactions between populations of heterogeneous households, ﬁrms and commercial banks, as well as
a capital goods ﬁrm, a central bank and a central government. The innovative part of the model is that it addresses changes
in carbon intensity of the economy resulting from innovation and diffusion of associated less carbon-intensive (“greener”)
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 products, but without assuming – exogenously – speciﬁc household inclinations for greener products. In addition, the model
includes a rich set of behavioral patterns for the social mediation of preferences. The consumer markets feature heteroge-
neous agents on both the supply and demand sides. In that way ﬁrms adapt their output, size and technological trajectory
in co-evolutionary dependence on the heterogeneous social evolution of household preferences, in particular for needs and
wants aspirations. The model accounts furthermore for ﬁrms ﬁnancing emission reduction technology via ownership wealth
and corporate loans with mutual credit relations to individual banks. 
Six policy scenarios were studied. A basic policy scenario T examined different levels of a ﬁxed carbon tax. The tax
revenues are used to create a “carbon fund” that is used to ﬁnance additional instruments of a climate policy package,
leading to four additional scenarios: subsidizing green innovation R , a shift from labor to carbon taxes L , a direct consumer
subsidy for greener (less carbon-intensive) products C , and green procurement P (governmental spending on green products).
In addition, we consider a policy package comprising all the mentioned policy instruments ALL . 
The artiﬁcial agent-based economy was simulated for 30 years. We chose parameter values following empirical evi-
dence from the literature (see Appendix 2 ) plus calibrated the parameters via an extensive sensitivity analysis (see online
Appendix 4 ) for the baseline case, scenario BAU. The resulting artiﬁcial economy develops on a stable disequilibrium path
with an average unemployment rate around 1/8th of the labor force and an average annual consumer price inﬂation of 2%
over the whole simulation run. In addition to that, we targeted for a left-skewed wealth distribution with this parameter
setting as well as a rather risk-averse banking sector. The simulation results show that in all scenarios low levels of a car-
bon tax cause a monotonous decrease in carbon intensity. However, a decrease in total emissions for all scenarios can be
observed after 10 years. Under all scenarios, real GDP increases while unemployment stays at almost the same level for
scenario T and R (the latter even with lower unemployment than BAU ), but increases for the other scenarios. Furthermore, a
close analysis suggests that scenario R signiﬁcantly outperforms all other scenarios across different levels of the carbon tax
in economic as well as environmental terms. This result is striking, but we need to highlight that scenario R also has the
lowest level of wealth redistribution, although in this respect it performs better than the baseline case. Furthermore, we ﬁnd
that our model study does not indicate a double dividend in terms of emissions reduction and employment increase due
to shifting taxes from labor to carbon (i.e., scenario L ). A win–win outcome for the economy and the environment results
though with scenario R , i.e., requires a combination of carbon taxes and innovation subsidies for R&D on carbon productivity.
Scenarios C, P and ALL perform very well in emission reduction but face signiﬁcant adverse economic side-effects, such as a
considerably higher unemployment or a lower GDP, thus achieving a reduction in total emissions partly through economic
decline. 
The given analysis allows a dynamic comparison of economic and environmental performances of CPPs. If the government
spends the collected carbon tax sums for discounting greener products or for lowering the income tax, the co-evolutionary
dynamics of heterogeneous ﬁrm and household behavior faces signiﬁcant inertia in increasing the share of greener products.
As a result, our simulation experiments show that households may even demand more carbon-intensive products in such
cases, because those ﬁrms intending to change their technological trajectory cannot grow quickly enough to satisfy the
increasing demand stemming from the recycled carbon tax sums. That is why subsidizing research and development with
the revenues from the carbon tax outperforms all the other CPPs. 
As this analysis depends on the heterogeneity of ﬁrms as well as households, the result can only be shown via a disag-
gregated complex adaptive system such as the presented evolutionary macroeconomic model. One of the main features of
the model presented here is that the disaggregated economy is structured through evolving local interaction networks and
individual preferences. As a result, the artiﬁcial economy develops via nonlinear and cumulative causation. An aggregated
– e.g., computable general equilibrium – or partly aggregated system – e.g., ABM with aggregated ﬁrm and/or household
sectors – would allow for immediate adaptation of all capacities to the new technological trajectory and would thereby
overlook such deeper problems of inertia emerging through a risk-averse banking sector and the co-evolutionary dynamics
of the complex adaptive system. 
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Table A.1.1 
Simulation phases. 
Monthly simulation phases 
Founding phase 
Households evaluate and initiate ﬁrm founding 
Production phase 
Firms demand estimation and pricing 
Firms credit adjustment and production 
Firms adapt prices 
Sales and consumption phase 
Conditional (scenario P): Government purchases products with low carbon intensity 
Conditional (scenario C): Government calculates consumption subsidy base pre consumption 
Households check ﬁnancial status 
Households decide consumption budget 
Households buy need goods 
Households (capitalists) buy want goods 
Households (workers) buy want goods 
Households update need vendor lists 
Households update want vendor lists 
Households balance accounts with savings if indebted or declare bankruptcy 
Wages payment phase 
Firms pay wages 
Government pays pensions 
Government pays unemployment subsidies 
Saving phase 
Households transfer money to savings accounts 
Interest and consolidation phase 
Banks collect credit interest 
Banks collect credit repayments 
Banks calculate accounts interest 
Banks calculate savings interest 
Banks pay central bank loans interest 
Banks pay central bank loans repayments 
Firms’ monthly accounting 
Banks verify ﬁrms’ solvency 
Banks monthly accounting 
Banks calculate reﬁnancing demands 
Banks reﬁnance at central bank 
Banks transfer funds to facilities at central bank 
Central banks pay reserve interest 
Central banks pay deposit facilities interest 
Government reﬁnancing phase 
Update macro indicators 
Banks monthly accounting 
Central banks monthly accounting 
Government monthly accounting 
Country updates macro indicators 
Annual simulation phases 
Annual accounting phase 
Banks collect and pay accounts interest 
Banks pay savings interest 
Firms calculate proﬁts and pay taxes 
Banks calculate proﬁts and pay taxes 
Firms distribute proﬁts 
Banks distribute proﬁts 
Capital goods ﬁrms distribute proﬁts 
Government calculates annual emission tax redistribution funds 
Firms evaluate R&D activities 
Government update annual statistics (annual taxes) 
Country compile annual report 
Government check minimum wage increase 
Government increases unemployment subsidies if minimum wage increased 
Government evaluates pension increase based on CPI 
Firms evaluate wage increases based on CPI 
Capital goods ﬁrm adapts prices based on CPI 
Firms depreciate production capital 
Firms engage in R&D activities 
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 Appendix 2. Technical details of the computational simulation 
Computational simulations of the model were performed with Netlogo (Wilensky 1999), version 5.3.1. We used Netlogo’s
built-in BehaviorSpace experiment management engine to repeat each scenario and tax level combination 100 times, every
time using a different random seed to test the effect of random factors in the model. Aggregate time series data was gener-
ated directly by BehaviorSpace for each period, whereas micro data was only saved for selected periods. Data analysis and
visualization was realized using the R language (using the ggplot2 package). 
The experiments were run with 50 0 0 households including worker, pensioner and capitalist households, and started with
an initial ﬁrm population of 250 ﬁrms. Additionally the experiment included ﬁve banks, a rudimentary capital goods ﬁrm, a
government and a central bank. Other relevant simulation parameters are shown in Table A.2.1 . 
The baseline simulation (i.e., the business as usual scenario, BAU ) was calibrated using the results of sensitivity analyses
(see Appendix 4 ) so that the artiﬁcial economy follows a steady path of economic development with an average unemploy-
ment rate around 1/8th of the labor force, an average annual price inﬂation of 2% over the whole simulation run and a
left-skewed wealth distribution. 
The choice of simulation parameters was made in accordance with existing agent-based macroeconomic models from
the literature and wherever possible we have listed references to empirical support of choices made. 
Household parameters 
Gaffeo et al. (2008) characterize agents “by loyalty” to trading partners of former periods. Lengnick (2013 : 105) takes
up this behavioral motive and develops a network approach for trading partners. We took the opportunity to follow thisTable A.2.1 
Simulation parameters. 
Households 
Number of vendors on preferred lists ( γ 2 ) 7 
Number of regular replacement checks (monthly) 1 
Reserves of needs 1 period 
Intended consumption rate, worker households ( β1 ) 0.1 
Intended consumption rate, wealthy worker households ( β2 ) 0.15 
Intended consumption rate, capitalist households ( β3 ) 0.2 
Rate of consumption with respect to savings (monthly) ( γ 1 ) 0.05/12 
Initial savings endowment of worker households X 2 
∗annual wage h ; X 2 ~ U (1, 2) 
Initial savings endowment of capitalist households 10 ∗( initial minimum wage ) 
Firms 
Initial ratio capital (individual ﬁrm level) to wages (annual) 2 
Production reserve stock rate ( α1 ) 0.1 
Unsold stock depreciation rate (per period) ( δ1 ) 0.5 
Capital depreciation rate (annual) 0.1 
Firm founding probability (monthly) 0.05 
Price adjustment rate ( α2 ) 0.01 
Maximum price adjustment ( α3 ) 0.1 
Stock adjustment indifference rate ( α4 ) 0.25 
Common ﬁxed production technology coeﬃcient ( α5 ) 1 
Labor productivity parameter ( α7 ) 3750 
New price adoption probability ( θ 1 ) 0.3 
R&D base success ( ζ 1 ) 0.02 
R&D maximum spillover ( ζ 2 ) 0.5 
R&D early mover advantage ( ζ 3 ) 0.02 
Banks 
Credit term 5 years 
Credit interest rate (annual) 0.04 
Account interest rate (annual) 0.01 
Account overdraft rate (private credit, annual) 0.05 
Savings interest rate (annual) 0.015 
Firm credit risk parameter ( φ1 ) 0.5 
Central bank deposit interest rate (annual) 0.01 
Central bank loans interest rate (annual) 0.02 
Governments 
Initial minimum wage 1000 
Initial unemployment subsidy 1000 
Minimum wage increase minimal interval 5 years 
Duration of the protection against dismissal ( η1 ) 2 months 
Value added tax rate 0.1 
Income tax rate (ﬂat for all capitalist households) 0.15 
Corporate tax rate (banks, ﬁrms, capital goods ﬁrm) ( τ 1 ) 0.15 
Carbon tax rate ( τ 2 ) 0.025, 0.0625, 0.1 
Labor tax rate (ﬂat for all worker households) 0.15 
Capital gains tax rate 0.15 
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 approach with adaptations as given in Section 2.1 . The value for a preferred list of trading partners is parameterized as a
list of 7 vendors per household, with the same conﬁguration as in Lengnick (2013 : 105). 
In line with the same source (p. 108), wealthier households are inclined to consume less of their disposable income.
Parameter β3 indicates the capitalist household’s intended consumption, set as 20%. Elsewhere we have outlined ( Rengs
and Scholz-Wäckerle 2019 : Eq. (17)) that such a rate results into intended consumption as 80% of disposable income plus a
small additional reserve from savings (dependent on γ 1 , ibid. equation 18). For worker households ( β1 = 0 . 1 ), the intended
consumption uses up 90% of disposable income. This parameterization follows comparably similar works in the agent-based
macroeconomic literature, e.g., the propensity to consume from current income as set to 80% in Russo et al. (2016 : 36) or
63% in Caiani et al. (2016 : 406). Furthermore, we assume that households with positive savings of all classes set aside a
very small share of their savings for additional consumption, dependent on γ1 = 0 . 05 12 . This wealth-dependent consumption
component is followed also Gaffeo et al. (2008) or by Lengnick (2013 : 108) who refers to empirical evidence by Souleles
(1999) as well as Carroll and Kimball (1996) . 
Firm parameters 
Following similar agent-based macroeconomic models, we set the production reserve stock rate ( α1 ) to 10%, meaning in
particular that 10% of produced output are kept as inventories, in order to be prepared for situations of short-term excess
demand. Our approach is similar to Ciarli et al. (2010 : 243) with a desired ratio of inventories of 10% (who tested between
11% and 25%) and Dosi et al. (2010 : 1755) with desired inventories of 10%. In addition, we employ a price adjustment rate
for ﬁrms in our model – not to be misunderstood as a markup rate. We restrained from implementing a markup rule
eventually, because it led to rather unrealistic and drastic movements in prices, since ﬁrms usually do’ not pass on increases
in costs to their customers immediately, otherwise they would experience consequential losses in the number of customers.
That is why in our model we opted for ﬁrms adjusting the price simply in correspondence to relative changes in demand as
well as to changes in their own inventories. We thereby employ a possible spectrum of price adjustment from a minimum
value of α2 = 1% to a maximum value of α3 = 10% , for every ﬁrm. All ﬁrms start with a ﬁxed technological coeﬃcient of 1,
implying that ﬁrms are not innovating from the start. The capital intensity parameter α6 is set to 20%, comparable to Ciarli
et al. (2010 : 243), with an intensity of 40%, by referring empirically to King and Levine (1994) . Capital depreciates annually
in our model and follows thereby a different approach as other models of this kind. We use a simple accounting rule that
depreciates capital with 10% per year. Others such as Dawid et al. (2018 : Table 8) depreciate capital with 1% per month or
Ciarli et al. (2010 : 243) test for ranges between 3 and 14% per month. The initial endowment of a ﬁrm is parameterized as
twice the sum of the wages and is a qualitative approximation for small and medium sized enterprises. 
Following Qi (2019 : 47–48) innovation spillover is “in reality more likely to be partial…where the spillover factor is
φ = 0 . 5 . With partial innovation spillover, the entrants are less advantageous over the incumbents compared to the full
spillover case.” In our parameter setting we choose ζ2 = 0 . 5 , having the maximum spillover factor given by 50%. 
Bank parameters 
Credit terms are set to 5 years following Caiani et al. (2016 : 385), whereby the interest rate on loans is set to 4%,
representing an average value between 1% chosen by Dosi et al. (2010 : 1755) and the 0.75% per month by Caiani et al.
(2016 : 406). The interest rate on deposits is set to 1% and on savings 1.5%, therefore a little bit lower than the 0.25% per
month in Caiani et al. (2016 : 406) and same as the generic rate given in Dosi et al. (2010 : 1755). The central bank rate for
loans is set to 2% whereas Caiani et al. (2016 : 406) choose a monthly rate of 0.5%. 
Government parameters 
We set the income tax rate as well as the proﬁt tax to 15% which is in line with the benchmark agent-based macroeco-
nomic model by Caiani et al. (2016 : 406) who set those two parameters to 18%. 
Appendix 3. Utility speciﬁcations for worker and capitalist classes 
Here is more background information on how utility is speciﬁed for each social class. 
Needs aspirations of workers 
The needs aspirations of workers were already speciﬁed in Eqs. (1) –( 4 ) in Section 2 . Parameterization of the price effect
involves setting ξ = 0 . 75 . 
Wants aspirations of workers 
Signaling-by-consuming is deﬁned here in accordance with Eqs. (1) –( 4 ), by setting ξ = 0 . 25 . In this case we put a much
stronger weight for the bandwagon effect than for the price effect. 
Wants aspirations of wealthy workers are described by 
b v 1 ,i,t = 
(
p i,t − p min,t 
p max,t − p min,t 
)
(A5) 
U i, j,t = b v 1 ,i,t b 2 , j,t ξ + b 3 ,i,t ( 1 − ξ ) (A6) 
Signaling-by-consuming is deﬁned here in accordance with Eqs. (5) , ( 2 ), ( 3 ) and ( 6 ), by setting ξ = 0 . 25 , assigning a
much stronger weight for the bandwagon effect than for the price effect. The price effect ( b v 
1 
) is now a Veblen effect and
thus reversed. 
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 Needs aspirations of capitalists 
b s 3 ,i,t = 
(
v max,t − v i,t 
v max,t − v min,t 
)
(A7)
U i, j,t = b 1 ,i,t b 2 , j,t ξ + b s 3 ,i,t ( 1 − ξ ) (A8)
Signaling-by-consuming is deﬁned here in accordance with Eqs. (1) , ( 2 ), ( 7 ) and ( 8 ), by setting ξ = 0 . 5 , thus putting equal
weights for the bandwagon and price effects. The price effect ( b 1 ) is again a regular price effect (though less strong because
of the different ξ parameterization). Furthermore, b s 
3 
now represents a snob effect. 
Wants aspirations of capitalists 
U i, j,t = b v 1 ,i,t b 2 , j,t ξ + b s 3 ,i,t ( 1 − ξ ) (A9)
Signaling-by-consuming is deﬁned here in accordance with Eqs. (5) , ( 2 ), ( 7 ) and ( 9 ), by setting ξ = 0 . 5 , thus setting
again equal weights for the bandwagon and price effects. The price effect (now b v 
1 
) is a Veblen effect as in the case of needs
aspirations of capitalists while b s 
3 
again represents a snob effect. 
Appendix 4. Sensitivity analysis 
Here we present the results of sensitivity analyses of the main parameters in the model (listed in Appendix 2 ), in order
to prove the robustness of presented simulation results as well as motivate certain parameter values adopted. In each ex-
periment, a parameter or combination of parameters is simulated 100 times for different random seeds to account for the
inﬂuences of the model’s stochastic elements. The following sensitivity experiments were performed with the same scale
as the simulations presented above. Univariate sensitivity experiments (1–15) have been performed for “sensitive” parame-
ters that have been identiﬁed through extensive testing of the model system, which cause signiﬁcant changes in simulation
results once altered, as is common in the agent-based macroeconomic literature. Table A.4.1 lists these parameters. 
In addition, we provide results for three multivariate experiments, to address the sensitivity of the climate extension
of the model, which combine the carbon tax (three levels) with the R&D base success rate ( ζ 1 ) (experiment 16); R&D
maximum spillover effect ( ζ 2 ) (experiment 17); and the R&D early mover advantage ( ζ 3 ) (experiment 17). 
For every presented simulation experiment, we show the trajectories of the most important economic indicators over
simulation runs of 30 years (360 months/periods). In each graph below, the dashed line represents the results for the pa-
rameter value chosen in the baseline ( BAU ) case. The shaded areas around the timelines indicate 0.05 and 0.95 percentiles,
respectively, of the annual average of all simulation results. 
Sensitivity Experiment 1 : Variation of γ 2 (number of vendors on preferred lists) 
In the ﬁrst experiment, as presented in Fig. A.4.1 , the parameter γ 2 , representing the length of households’ shortlist for
buying on the consumer market, i.e., the number of vendors that a household will prefer to buy from, was varied over a
technically meaningful range of [1,10]. 
The parameter has a strong economic inﬂuence only for extreme cases of γ 3 ≤ 2. There prices increase steadily due
to the stable individual ﬁrm’s demands, which distorts the market and eventually leads to drops in sales paralleled by a
strong increase in inequality. Furthermore an extended shortlist of γ 3 ≥ 8 initially has a rather strong impact on the initial
adaption process of the price level during the ﬁrst years due to the increasing ﬁrm’s individual demand and other calibrated
model behavior. Such extended shortlists lead to a broader distribution of the consumer price. 
Sensitivity Experiment 2 : Variation of the number of regular replacement checks (monthly) 
In this experiment, as presented in Fig. A.4.2 , we explore the sensitivity of voluntary changes of (some form of) household
vendor/brand loyalty on the consumer market. Settings range from slowly adapting habits [1] up to effectively having no
vendor/brand loyalty at all [7], where all entries on a household’s shortlist are evaluated and adapted every period/month. 
High values of this parameter represent more rational agents, who very quickly adapt their actions to their preferences.
For very frequent ( > 3) voluntary changes in demand, adaptations are so frequent that it results in long term economic
ﬂuctuation. We can see quickly increasing prices that lead to high (excess) investments (resulting in low capacity utiliza-
tion) and low unemployment. After prices adjust to the individual demand, production and sales grow very strongly, withTable A.4.1 
Parameters tested in univariate sensitivity experiments 1–15. 
Household parameters Firm, bank and government parameters Climate extension 
Number of vendors on preferred lists ( γ 2 ) Production reserve stock rate ( α1 ) R&D base success ( ζ 1 ) 
Number of regular replacement checks Probability of households for founding a new ﬁrm R&D maximum spillover ( ζ 2 ) 
Intended consumption rate of worker households ( β1 ) Price adjustment rate ( α2 ) R&D early mover advantage ( ζ 3 ) 
Intended consumption rate of wealthy worker 
households ( β2 ) 
Labor productivity parameter ( α7 ) 
Intended consumption rate of capitalist 
households ( β3 ) 
Firm credit risk parameter ( φ1 ) 
Rate of consumption with respect to savings ( γ 1 ) Duration of the protection against dismissal ( η1 ) 
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Fig. A.4.1. Simulation results for sensitivity Experiment 1: variation of γ 2 (number of vendors on preferred lists). 
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Fig. A.4.2. Simulation results for Sensitivity Experiment 2: variation of the number of regular replacement checks (monthly). 
 
 
 
 capitalists average wealth increasing strongly, even though real GDP is lower than in the baseline case. Medium settings of
this parameter initially lead to somewhat stronger initial price increases than in the baseline case, but without maxing out
the capacities of the labor market. Therefore, the parameter for replacements per period is set to a value of 1. 
Sensitivity Experiment 3 : Variation of β1 (Intended consumption rate of worker households) 
In this experiment, as presented in Fig A.4.3 , we explore parameter conﬁgurations for the intended consumption rate
(thus indirectly the savings rate) of the worker households (including unemployed and pensioner households). We vary it
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Fig. A.4.3. Simulation results for Sensitivity Experiment 3: variation of β1 (intended consumption rate of worker households). 
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Fig. A.4.4. Simulation results for Sensitivity Experiment 4: variation of β2 (intended consumption rate of wealthy worker households). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 within a range of 85%–95% of their income, i.e., a rate which is always at least as high as the intended consumption rate of
the wealthy worker class in the baseline case. The rate is called an intended rate as households rely on the availability of
consumer goods to fulﬁll their needs and wants, which is not guaranteed in cases of excess demand. 
The results show that an intended consumption rate of 0.9 guarantees an average and stable economic development
path for the chosen macroeconomic aggregates. Lowering the rate will lead to slightly higher unemployment rates due to
eventual drops in aggregate demand (see total sales) translating into smaller ﬁrms. A higher intended consumption rate
will lead to higher total emissions and price inﬂation. The distribution of wealth becomes more equal with a smaller β1
since worker households save more from their monthly budget. Since the working class makes up the largest part of the
population, changes in its intended consumption rate leads to a more volatile distribution of results than changes in β2 and
β3 (compare the next two experiments). 
Sensitivity Experiment 4 : Variation of β2 (Intended consumption rate of wealthy worker households) 
In this experiment, as presented in Fig. A.4.4 , we explore the effect of variating the intended consumption rate (thus
indirectly the savings rate) of the wealthy worker households, who form a rather small share of the simulated population.
We variate it within a range of 80%–90% of their income, i.e., a rate which is always at least as high as the intended
consumption rate of the capitalist class and always at most as high as the one of the worker class in the baseline case. 
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Fig. A.4.5. Simulation results for Sensitivity Experiment 5: variation of β3 (intended consumption rate of capitalist households). 
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Fig. A.4.6. Simulation results for Sensitivity Experiment 6: variation of γ 1 (rate of consumption with respect to savings). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Sensitivity Experiment 5 : Variation of β3 (Intended consumption rate of capitalist households) 
In this experiment, as presented in Fig. A.4.5 , we explore the effect of variating the intended consumption rate (thus
indirectly the savings rate) of the capitalist households, who form the smallest class of the simulated population. We variate
it within a range of 75%–85% of their income, i.e., a rate which is always at most as high as the one of the wealthy worker
class in the baseline case. 
Capitalists consume the smallest share of their income compared to the other two classes, but changes in that share (at
the given interval) do not lead to signiﬁcant differences on aggregate. 
Sensitivity Experiment 6 : Variation of γ 1 (Rate of consumption with respect to savings) 
In this sensitivity experiment, as presented in Fig. A.4.6 , we explore the effect of varying γ 1 , where all households
consume additional goods ﬁnanced not by income, but by withdrawing some funds from their savings. The rate is variated
between withdrawing 3.5%–6.5% of each individuals’ savings per year – distributed over each month. 
There is a rather strong initial effect for higher shares – of withdrawing from savings for consumption – in the ﬁrst period
of the simulation. After these price adaptions have taken place, the economies settle for a very similar macro behavior,
albeit a very different levels (price, output, GDP, unemployment, etc.). The more savings are additionally used for household
consumption the better will be the ﬁnal sales of ﬁrms. This increase in demand leads to less unemployment, more equality
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Fig. A.4.7. Simulation results for Sensitivity Experiment 7: variation of α1 (production reserve stock rate). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 with regard to wealth across social classes, but higher prices and higher total emissions. The opposite is true for lower
shares of withdrawing from savings for household consumption. Eventually, the chosen setting for this parameter – in the
main simulation of the article – is exactly in-between those more extreme cases, γ 1 is set to 0.5. 
Sensitivity Experiment 7 : Variation of α1 (Production reserve stock rate) 
In this experiment, as presented in Fig. A.4.7 , we explore the effect of changes in α1 , i.e., how much more goods ﬁrms
will produce than they expect for their estimated individual demand in the next period. This reserve stock is then monitored
by ﬁrms and used as a proxy for the individual demand of their goods. 
In this sensitivity experiment a special situation occurs with very low values of α1 . There are two main effects: First,
ﬁrms use the reserve stock as a buffer to meet previously unexpected demand. When they have less reserve stock, they
will lose customers more quickly, due to unmet excess demand for their goods. Thus, the households will more often buy
at other ﬁrms to fulﬁll their need consumption. Smaller reserve stocks will then lead to empty reserve stocks much quicker
and ﬁrms will increase production capacities much faster. These dynamics lead secondly (in the short and medium run) to
a fall in prices, because ﬁrms produce too much due to the previous capacity expansion and need to get rid of their sup-
plies now, that’s why they start lowering their prices rapidly at this point in simulation time. Further, the fall in prices can
eventually attract more demand in the medium run and ﬁnal sales increase tremendously in this case. These somehow spe-
cial circumstances (deﬂationary dynamics) in this case – given by the very low reserve stock rate – lead to full employment
after 20 years, although with a very high inequality in wealth and moreover with a steeply increasing and very high output
of total emissions. The calibration of α1 = 1 makes a very reasonable parameter setting, where the production reserve stock
rate represents just a high enough buffer to dodge short-run excess in demand and prevent deﬂationary dynamics. Higher
values of α1 lead otherwise to inﬂationary dynamics that need to get avoided as well. 
Sensitivity Experiment 8 : Variation of the probability of households founding a new ﬁrm 
The ﬁrm founding probability affects foremost ﬁnal sales and thereby real GDP. Every month there is a chance between
0% and 15% that one of the wealthy worker households founds a new ﬁrm of startup size. The sensitivity experiment, as
presented in Fig. A.4.8 , indicates that higher values of this probability decrease total sales and thereby GDP. 
Basically, a higher chance of founding new ﬁrms comes together with higher prices with less produced and sold goods,
because there are more heterogeneous ﬁrms. This effect leads nevertheless to a more equal distribution of wealth across
social classes. Finally, we refer to a ﬁrm founding probability of 5% for the parameter in the main simulation of the article.
For this value, sales are still improving over time and we ﬁnd an average rate of unemployment, compared to the other
potential values. 
Sensitivity Experiment 9 : Variation of α2 (Price adjustment rate) 
The actual price variation will be a fraction of this value, see Eq. (8) in Rengs and Scholz-Wäckerle, 2019 : 239). In the
given sensitivity experiment, as presented in Fig. A.4.9 , we have varied this value between 0.25% and 1.75% of the average
base price of the simulation run. 
A higher rate of price adjustment makes price dynamics more volatile, whereas a very low adjustment rate leads to price
stagnation as well as lower levels of unemployment. However, these employment gains depend on a steeper increase in
total sales, which translates also into much higher levels of emissions and a more unequal distribution of wealth. Otherwise
higher levels of the adjustment rate lead just to a parallelization between the scenarios at higher macro outcomes. Therefore,
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Fig. A.4.8. Simulation results for Sensitivity Experiment 8: variation of the probability of households founding a new ﬁrm. 
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Fig. A.4.9. Simulation results for Sensitivity Experiment 9: variation of α2 (price adjustment rate). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 the parameter was calibrated at 1%, indicating an average developmental path of macroeconomic aggregates, within the
spectrum of the parameter interval. 
Sensitivity Experiment 10 : Variation of α7 (Labor productivity parameter) 
The labor productivity parameter determines the ﬁrm’s production technology, i.e., how many goods (units) can a worker
produce per month, at given technology. We have tested variations for α7 between 1500 units and 6750 units per month
(stepwise increased with 750 units), as presented in Fig. A.4.10 . Settings where labor productivity is above 40 0 0 units per
month translate (obviously) into higher unemployment. Nevertheless, ﬁrms can yield slightly higher ﬁnal sales than on
average at such productivity levels that increases real GDP as well but also total emissions. A higher productivity leads
otherwise to a more unequal distribution of wealth. 
Moreover, the parameter plays a central role in the initialization process of the main simulation in the article because it
can be used to directly regulate unemployment in the economy. If productivity is high, but the demand for goods remains
the same, then unemployment increases. If productivity is very low, then at some point the worker households with lower
income can only ﬁnance their need consumption and prices increase rapidly (see productivity of e.g., 1500 or 2250 units per
month), as overall demand cannot be satisﬁed. Where employment is very high in the short run (almost hitting full employ-
ment), it falls tremendously in the medium run where we observe an unusually steeply increasing rate of unemployment
B. Rengs, M. Scholz-Wäckerle and J. van den Bergh / Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 169 (2020) 332–368 357 
95%
100%
105%
110%
115%
5 10 15 20 25 30
Year
To
ta
l E
m
is
si
on
s
1500
2250
3000
3750
4500
5250
6000
6750
100%
110%
120%
130%
5 10 15 20 25 30
Year
G
D
P 
(r
ea
l)
1500
2250
3000
3750
4500
5250
6000
6750
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
5 10 15 20 25 30
Year
U
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t R
at
e
1500
2250
3000
3750
4500
5250
6000
6750
1.0
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
5 10 15 20 25 30
Year
Co
ns
um
er
 P
ri
ce
 In
de
x
1500
2250
3000
3750
4500
5250
6000
6750
100%
110%
120%
5 10 15 20 25 30
Year
Sa
le
s 
(q
ua
n
ty
)
1500
2250
3000
3750
4500
5250
6000
6750
70%
80%
90%
100%
5 10 15 20 25 30
Year
A
vg
 c
ap
ita
lis
t w
ea
lth
 (r
ea
l) 1500
2250
3000
3750
4500
5250
6000
6750
Fig. A.4.10. Simulation results for Sensitivity Experiment 10: variation of α7 (labor productivity parameter). 
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Fig. A.4.11. Simulation results for Sensitivity Experiment 11: variation of ζ 1 (R&D base success). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (at a productivity of 1500 units/month). These experiments with lower productivity lead also to a more equal distribution
of wealth. Given this sensitivity of the parameter, α7 is set to 3750 units/month. 
Sensitivity Experiment 11 : Variation of ζ 1 (R&D base success) 
The R&D base success rate ( ζ 1 ) sets the percentage of productivity gains for allocation of investment in R&D between
carbon and labor productivity improvements. Setting ζ1 = 0 leads to the rather hypothetical case where ﬁrms make their
R&D investments but do’ not get any returns with regard to process innovation. Consequently, this special case just increases
the cost burden of ﬁrms. Furthermore, R&D for carbon and labor productivity are both subject to spillover effects and an
early mover advantage. 
This sensitivity experiment shows that both types of R&D improve more if ζ 1 is assumed higher, as presented in
Fig. A.4.11 . Further, the experiment demonstrates that a higher initially assumed success rate (e.g., 4%) leads to very high
unemployment rates and a stark decrease in total emissions and consequently carbon intensity (combined with an increase
in real GDP). This comes with a socioeconomic burden, namely a higher unemployment and a more unequal distribution
of wealth. On the contrary, ζ1 = 1 leads to unstable inﬂationary dynamics with lower unemployment, total sales and real
GDP). Eventually ζ = 0 . 02 makes a meaningful setting parameter setting for the base success rate of R&D. 1 
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Fig. A.4.12. Simulation results for Sensitivity Experiment 12: variation of ζ 2 (R&D maximum spillover). 
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Fig. A.4.13. Simulation results for Sensitivity Experiment 13: variation of ζ 3 (R&D early mover advantage). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Sensitivity Experiment 12 : Variation of ζ 2 (R&D maximum spillover) 
Here we obtain similar results as in experiment 11. Higher spillover effects lead to lower total emissions and carbon
intensity but at the cost of more unemployment and inequality, as presented in Fig. A.4.12 . 
Sensitivity Experiment 13 : Variation of ζ 3 (R&D early mover advantage) 
The early mover advantage is modeled as a discount factor on R&D success, implying lower productivity gains from R&D
investment the longer the ﬁrm waits with such investment. A higher early mover advantage translates into a lower real GDP
and higher total emissions (and worse carbon intensity), as presented in Fig. A.4.13 . In addition, a higher ζ 3 leads to less
inequality of wealth. 
Sensitivity Experiment 14 : Variation of φ1 (Firm credit risk parameter) 
The more a ﬁrm can expose itself to private debt for investment purposes – in relation to its capital – the faster it is
able to grow via increases in production capacities. In this sensitivity experiment, we have tested the credit risk parameter
between 40% and 60%, as presented in Fig. A.4.14 . 
Higher values for φ1 result almost directly into more ﬁnal sales, higher levels of real GDP therefore and correspondingly
more total emissions. Otherwise, lower levels of the credit risk parameter translate into an unstable economic developmen-
tal path, where ﬁrms are not able to adapt to changes in demand in the short run. Excess demand cannot get satisﬁed and
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Fig. A.4.14. Simulation results for Sensitivity Experiment 14: variation of φ1 (ﬁrm credit risk parameter). 
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Fig. A.4.15. Simulation results for Sensitivity Experiment 15: variation of η1 (duration of the protection against dismissal). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 consumers change their preferred vendors at a very frequent level which otherwise comes with serious inﬂationary dynam-
ics. Since the ﬁnal sales are super low, the employment of workers cannot get sustained and we face unemployment levels
higher than 15% (at φ1 = 0 . 4 ). For the parameter calibration, it was very important to avoid such very unstable and unique
economic dynamics, that is why we set φ1 = 0 . 5 as a reasonable value of the credit risk parameter. 
Sensitivity Experiment 15 : Variation of η1 duration of the protection against dismissal 
The ﬁnal univariate sensitivity experiment we have conducted deals with the duration of the protection against dismissal.
We assume government enforces this protection for a number of months. In this experiment we have tested the protection
duration between 0 and 6 months, as presented in Fig. A.4.15 . 
In the medium and long run, no protection or just a one month protection result into a very unstable labor market,
where ﬁrms change their labor force far too often, which obviously results in lower unemployment, but at the cost of a
much lower capacity utilization (~20% lower than in the other cases with a higher duration). This low capacity utilization
causes inﬂationary dynamics and consequently higher levels of total emissions. Therefore, we set the parameter to two
months of labor protection, in accordance with Seppecher (2012) . 
Multivariate S ensitivity Experiment 16 : Variation of ζ 1 (R&D base success) with different tax levels under the scenario T
This is the ﬁrst of three multivariate variations, experiments indicating the interdependency of crucial parameter constel-
lations and their resulting economic dynamics. This experiment deals with variations of the R&D base success rate, combined
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Fig. A.4.16a. Simulation results for total emissions under multivariate sensitivity Experiment 16: variation of ζ 1 (R&D base success) with different tax 
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Fig. A.4.16b. Simulation results for carbon intensity under sensitivity Experiment 16: variation of ζ 1 (R&D base success) with different tax levels under the 
scenario T . 
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Fig. A.4.16c. Simulation results for unemployment rate under multivariate sensitivity Experiment 16: variation of ζ 1 (R&D base success) with different tax 
levels under the scenario T . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 with variations of the tax level, because it reﬂects the core of the environmental extension of the model. As given in the fol-
lowing Figs A.4.16a-16g , the resulting parameter permutations show similar results as made in the univariate experiment 12
on the parameter ζ 1 . However, the multivariate experiments are performed with the scenario setting T , which reﬂects our
basic climate policy scenario, i.e., a carbon tax at different levels (low, medium, high). Funds from the tax are redistributed
to households as we extensively explained in the main article. 
The variation of the R&D base success rate leads to different levels of total emissions (see Fig. A.4.16a ), where a higher
rate translates directly into less emissions, as we have already shown with experiment 12. However, an additional variation
of the tax level indicates that at the highest carbon tax level, if R&D investments are not successful at all ( ζ = 0 ), emissions1 
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Fig. A.4.16d. Simulation results for consumer price index under multivariate sensitivity Experiment 16: variation of ζ 1 (R&D base success) with different 
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Fig. A.4.16e. Simulation results for GDP under multivariate sensitivity Experiment 16: variation of ζ 1 (R&D base success) with different tax levels under 
the scenario T . 
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Fig. A.4.16f. Simulation results for sales under multivariate sensitivity Experiment 16: variation of ζ 1 (R&D base success) with different tax levels under 
the scenario T . 
 
 
 
 
 drop below the time series of a 2% success rate ( ζ1 = 0 .02). This rather extraordinary case realizes, because ﬁrms ca’nnot
adapt to the excess demand, cannot realize their R&D investments and raise prizes therefore. 
We observe extremely stark inﬂationary dynamics, making the economy unstable, see Fig. A.4.16d . The effect can be seen
also in total income (GDP real – Fig. A.4.16e ) as well as total sales ( Fig. A.4.16f ) . This translates into more unemployment
compared to ζ1 = 0 .02 that we adopted for the main simulation. 
Eventually, if investments do not result into successful R&D improvements in either labor or carbon productivity, we
obtain a more equal distribution of wealth across classes, but obviously at a high cost since emissions and carbon intensity
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Fig. A.4.16g. Simulation results for average capitalist wealth under multivariate sensitivity Experiment 16: variation of ζ 1 (R&D base success) with different 
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Fig. A.4.17a. Simulation results for total emissions under multivariate sensitivity Experiment 17: variation of ζ 2 (R&D maximum spillover) with different 
tax levels under the scenario T . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 are at the highest level (see Fig. A.4.16g ). Overall, the experiment shows that the parameter calibration for the R&D base
success rate of ζ1 = 0 .02, delivers stable economic dynamics. 
Multivariate S ensitivity Experiment 17 : Variation of ζ 2 (R&D maximum spillover) with different tax levels under the
scenario T 
This sensitivity experiment shows simulation runs with multivariate parameter constellations, with a focus on the re-
search spillover effect. We start testing at ζ2 = 0 indicating a somewhat hypothetical case where ﬁrms invest in R&D but do
not get a successful process innovation in return. This special case just increases the cost burden of ﬁrms. Further variations
are made for 25%, 50%, 75% and a full 100% success at different tax levels (low, medium, high). This experiment adds upon
the results from sensitivity experiment 12 where we have performed univariate experiments around this parameter for the
BAU scenario. In general, the economic dynamics are similar to those in the related univariate experiment 12. 
The higher the R&D research spillover is assumed, the more total emissions can get reduced at all tax levels, having the
lowest level of emissions at 100% spillover within the high tax scenario (see Fig. A.4.17a ). The higher the tax level the more
narrow will be the ribbon of the simulation results, since output gets substantially reduced and thereby overall volatility. 
Even though total emissions are at far lower levels in the high tax scenario, we do not observe lower levels of carbon in-
tensity, which looks almost identical across the various tax levels per parameter setting (see Fig. A.4.17b ). In the medium and
high tax case, real GDP ( Fig. A.4.17e ) as well as ﬁnal sales ( Fig. A.4.17f ) drop signiﬁcant, implying a decrease in output that
is cancelling out the emission effect in the carbon intensity. The lower output results moreover in a higher unemployment
that is also very narrowly distributed across different settings for ζ 2 , since the labor market is less volatile ( Fig. A.4.17c ). 
From 0 to 25% spillover, combined with a high tax scenario, we can observe very high inﬂationary dynamics ( Fig. A.4.17d ).
Firms cannot adjust to the excess demand, as due to high costs they cannot expand and thus instead raise prices. 
Eventually, very low spillover effects combined with a high carbon tax may lead to a more equal distribution of wealth
( Fig. A.4.17g ), but at very high environmental and economic costs. The 50% research spillover effect delivers the most stable
economic dynamics for the variables above and promises a steady economic developmental path to study the more nuanced
climate policy packages in the main simulation experiments of the article, in addition to the empirical evidence from the
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Fig. A.4.17b. Simulation results for carbon intensity under multivariate sensitivity Experiment 17: variation of ζ 2 (R&D maximum spillover effect) with 
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Fig. A.4.17c. Simulation results for unemployment rate under multivariate sensitivity Experiment 17: variation of ζ 2 (R&D maximum spillover) with differ- 
ent tax levels under the scenario T . 
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Fig. A.4.17d. Simulation results for consumer price index under multivariate sensitivity Experiment 17: variation of ζ 2 (R&D maximum spillover) with 
different tax levels under the scenario T . 
 
 
 
 literature as given in Appendix 2 in the main article. In view of this, the research spillover effect is set to ζ2 = 0 . 5 for the
main simulation. 
Multivariate S ensitivity Experiment 18 : Variation of ζ 3 (R&D early mover advantage) with different tax levels under the
scenario T 
Sensitivity experiment 19 represents the ﬁnal experiment in this analysis and shows results from combining parameter
variations of the research early mover advantage ζ 3 at different tax levels. It adds upon experiment 13 where this parameter
was changed in univariate terms. 
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Fig. A.4.17e. Simulation results for GDP under multivariate sensitivity Experiment 17: variation of ζ 2 (R&D maximum spillover) with different tax levels 
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Fig. A.4.17f. Simulation results for sales under multivariate sensitivity Experiment 17: variation of ζ 2 (R&D maximum spillover) with different tax levels 
under the scenario T . 
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Fig. A.4.17g. Simulation results for average capitalist wealth under multivariate sensitivity Experiment 17: variation of ζ 2 (R&D maximum spillover) with 
different tax levels under the scenario T . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Basically, a low early mover advantage results into less total emissions and vice versa for higher settings (see Fig. A.4.18a ),
since ﬁrms still have a good success rate even when they enter the process innovation later than others. We see again
narrower ribbons at higher tax levels sue to the already mentioned drop in output, causing with less volatility at all markets.
Carbon intensity mimics the results from the previous multivariate experiment ( Fig. A.4.18b ). Where we can indicate
again almost the same levels at higher tax rates, but with less real GDP ( Fig. A.4.18e ) and total sales ( Fig. A.4.18f ) at those
levels. This notion translates again into higher unemployment. The unemployment reacts inversely to the previous experi-
ment. Lower settings for the early mover advantage lead to higher unemployment ( Fig. A.4.18c ), since ﬁrms can realize their
R&D projects more effectively and yield technological advances, resulting again into unemployment. 
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Fig. A.4.18b. Simulation results for carbon intensity under multivariate sensitivity Experiment 18, variation of ζ 3 (R&D early mover advantage) with differ- 
ent tax levels under the scenario T . 
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Fig. A.4.18c. Simulation results for unemployment rate under multivariate sensitivity Experiment 18: variation of ζ 3 (R&D early mover advantage) with 
different tax levels under the scenario T . 
 
 
 
 
 On the contrary, if ﬁrms are sanctioned more for starting late with investments in R&D (e.g., ζ3 = 0 . 04 ), they will raise
prices much faster in order to compensate the higher cost burden ( Fig. A.4.18d ); even more at higher tax rates. 
Output behaves similar as in the previous multivariate sensitivity experiments. Once we look into real GDP ( Fig. A.4.18e )
as well as ﬁnal sales ( Fig. A.4.18f ), we see that output drops on the one hand at higher tax rates, leading to even lower real
GDP at higher early mover advantages. 
The experiment shows furthermore again that the distribution of wealth is better off at higher tax rates (carbon also
redistributing across classes, as we also outline extensively in the main article) and at higher early mover advantages
( Fig. A.4.18g ), when ﬁrms face higher costs for the R&D investment at the end of the day. 
366 B. Rengs, M. Scholz-Wäckerle and J. van den Bergh / Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 169 (2020) 332–368 
Tax: low Tax: medium Tax: high
5 10 15 20 25 30 5 10 15 20 25 30 5 10 15 20 25 30
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
Year
Co
ns
um
er
 P
ri
ce
 In
de
x ζ₃
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
Fig. A.4.18d. Simulation results for consumer price index under multivariate sensitivity Experiment 18: variation of ζ 3 (R&D early mover advantage) with 
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Fig. A.4.18e. Simulation results for GDP under multivariate sensitivity Experiment 18: variation of ζ 3 (R&D early mover advantage) with different tax levels 
under the scenario T . 
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Fig. A.4.18f. Simulation results for sales under multivariate sensitivity Experiment 18: variation of ζ 3 (R&D early mover advantage) with different tax levels 
under the scenario T . 
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 Overall, this sensitivity experiment informs us reasonably on calibrating the early mover advantage at ζ3 = 0 . 02 , i.e., a
2% discount per simulated year. 
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